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Article 3

THE COORDINATION FALLACY
MICHAEL D. GILBERT & BRIAN BARNES
ABSTRACT
This symposium piece tackles an important issue in campaign finance: the relationship
between coordinated expenditures and corruption. Only one form of corruption, the quid pro
quo, is constitutionally significant, and it has three logical elements: (1) an actor, such as an
individual or corporation, conveys value to a politician, (2) the politician conveys value to
the actor, and (3) a bargain links the two. Campaign finance regulations aim to deter quid
pro quos by impeding the first or third element. Limits on contributions, for example, fight
corruption by capping the value an actor can convey to a politician. What about limits on
coordinated expenditures? By preventing coordination on large expenditures like television
ads, the law turns very useful support into less useful support, reducing the value an actor
can convey. But actors can surmount this with more money: $1 million spent on less useful
ads can convey a lot of value, often more than smaller amounts spent on very useful ads or
contributions. Limits on coordination may also inhibit bargaining, the third element of a
quid pro quo, but again, sophisticated actors can surmount this: they can bargain without
discussing the substance of any expenditures. So coordination regulations cannot deter
much corruption, at least not when wealthy and sophisticated actors are involved, the very
actors who cause the most concern. Consequently, coordination regulations may violate the
Constitution. This is not because coordinated expenditures do not corrupt but because
the regulations do not deter. Solving this problem requires more than a broader set of
regulations. It requires confronting a fallacy at the heart of campaign finance: the belief that
coordination relates in an operational way to corruption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,1 the Supreme
Court concluded that independent political expenditures do not cause
quid pro quo corruption.2 Because preventing such corruption is the
only permissible justification for restricting money in politics, 3 the
 Gilbert is the Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law at the University of Virginia.
Barnes is a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and a clerk to Judge Leslie
Southwick on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For helpful comments we
thank Debbie Hellman, David Keating, Michael Morley, Dan Ortiz, Brad Smith, Doug
Spencer, and participants at a symposium at Florida State University titled “The Law of
Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights and the Judicial
Regulation of the Political Thicket.”
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Id. at 357 (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
3. See id. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental
interest in preventing corruption . . . , that interest was limited to quid pro quo
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Court held that the government cannot limit independent expenditures.4 The case invalidated many rules on political spending, including spending by corporations on ads supporting candidates, and
prompted sharp criticism. Politicians, scholars, and others worried
that the decision would inject enormous sums into American politics.5
As President Obama declared, the Court “open[ed] the floodgates for
special interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections.”6
Since the decision, and beneath the cacophonous debate about
money in politics, a more technical, legal dispute has simmered.
The government cannot limit independent political expenditures, but
it can (and does) limit non-independent expenditures—known as
coordinated expenditures—because those, in the Court’s view, can
cause corruption. This raises a question: how to distinguish the two?7
Federal law draws the line by asking if the politician directed the
expenditure, either by requesting it or dictating its content.8 If the
answer is yes, then the expenditure was coordinated.
Critics claim that this approach opens a loophole.9 To illustrate,
suppose the owner of an oil company gives money to a super PAC run
corruption.”); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Any regulation must
instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.”).
4. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-61.
5. See, e.g., id. at 454 (“Corporations . . . have vastly more money with which to try to
buy access and votes.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign
Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012) (“When . . . independent expenditures can be
made without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be greater
than the risk from capped contributions.”); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, Campaign
Finance: Remedies Beyond the Court, 27 DEMOCRACY J., Winter 2013, at 38, 38 (“The
immediate impact of Citizens United and subsequent cases was a dramatic increase in the
amount that outside groups . . . could raise and spend in federal elections.”); John McCain
Blasts Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2012, 8:35 AM) (quoting John
McCain), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/john-mccain-citizens-united-super-pac_
n_1201425.html (“I predict to you that there will be huge scandals associated with this
huge flood of money.”).
6. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-state-union-address).
7. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 63 (2014) (“Without a doubt, the questions about
the current landscape that prompted the most animated responses concerned coordination
between campaigns and outside groups. . . . The challenge in this critical area of campaign
finance law is to grapple with the gap between the line the law draws and the line outside
observers expect it to draw.”); see also Eliza Newlin Carney, The Citizens United Ruling in
the Real World, NAT’L J. (Jan. 25, 2010) (“The biggest unanswered question is what defines
coordination between a corporation, union or other political player and a candidate.”).
8. We discuss federal law in detail infra Section II.B.
9. See, e.g., Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse & John McCain as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179) (“[S]uper PACs are coordinating with campaigns, and they are
using methods the Court did not contemplate in its Citizens United decision.”); Sam Stein,
Obama Will Appear at Two Super PAC Events, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2014, 11:59
AM) (quoting David Donnelly, executive director of the Public Campaign Action Fund),
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by a politician’s friend. The super PAC then uses the money to air
television ads supporting the politician. Neither the company owner
nor the friend consulted the politician, and so the politician did not
direct the expenditure, and that makes the expenditure independent.
But because the friend knows the politician and his electoral strategy, the expenditure benefits the politician as much as a coordinated
ad—and can corrupt like one (think favorable oil regulations). This
means politicians and their benefactors can coordinate as a matter of
fact without coordinating as a matter of law. As one observer put it,
“noncoordination is a joke.”10
Prominent voices have called for reform, advocating new and
stricter approaches to regulating coordination.11 Their proposals assume that the concept of coordination makes sense; it just needs
broader reach. In other words, they accept that “whole, total, true”
independence of expenditures and candidates would stymie corruption, just as the Supreme Court has said,12 but they argue that existing coordination rules fail to achieve that level of independence.
We believe this reasoning is faulty. Quid pro quo corruption has
three necessary elements: (1) a conveyance of value from an individual to a politician, (2) a conveyance of value from a politician to
an individual, and (3) a bargain linking the two. By putting distance
between individuals and politicians, coordination rules can make it
harder for the former to determine what would be very valuable
to the latter (perhaps a television ad during primetime) and what
would be only a little bit valuable (perhaps a radio spot about the
environment). This distance decreases the effectiveness of individuals’ expenditures (they may run the radio spot), which reduces the
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/13/obama-super-pacs_n_4958485.html (“Right now
our campaign finance system is more loophole than law, and nowhere is that more
apparent than what constitutes ‘coordination’ . . . .”); see also Richard Briffault,
Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 93-94 (2013) (observing that
coordination rules “reflect naïve thinking about the way a candidate . . . and a supportive
organization can coordinate” given the modern ease of communicating ideas through the
press and social media); Richard Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending – A Good Thing?,
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/
unlimited-campaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html (pointing out that allies of a
candidate can figure out what will be most helpful to the candidate “without even talking
to the candidate or to party officials”).
10. Kyle Langvardt, The Sorry Case for Citizens United: Remarks at the 2012
Charleston Law Review and Riley Institute of Law and Society Symposium, 6 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 569, 574 (2012); see also Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40 (“FEC regulations
that govern whether a group is considered to ‘coordinate’ its expenditures with a candidate
or political party are so permissive that they have proven more apt as a source of comedic
inspiration than anything else.”); The Editorial Bd., Editorial, The Line at the ‘Super PAC’
Trough, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/opinion/sunday/
the-line-at-the-super-pac-trough.html (calling single-candidate super PACs “a form of
legalized bribery” and calling the prohibition on their contact with candidates “a joke”).
11. See infra Section II.C.
12. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40.
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value conveyed. In theory, this should deter corruption by stifling the
first element of quid pro quo corruption—the value conveyed to the
politician. In practice, however, deterrence is limited because one can
offset a drop in effectiveness with more money. Spending $1 million
on a somewhat effective ad can convey a lot of value, more than a
smaller amount spent on a very effective ad. Alternatively, coordination rules, by putting distance between individuals and politicians,
can make it harder for them to communicate and negotiate. In theory, this should deter corruption by stifling the third element of quid
pro quo corruption—the bargain. But again, this fails in practice.
Coordination rules do not target bargaining effectively, and it is not
clear that they could.
These observations lead us to a tentative conclusion: coordination
rules simply cannot deter much corruption, at least not when
wealthy and sophisticated actors—the very actors who cause the
most concern—are involved. As a result, coordination rules may violate the Constitution. This is not because coordinated expenditures
do not corrupt but because the coordination rules do not deter. They
interfere with political speech without combating much corruption.
This problem cannot be resolved with a broader set of regulations,
or even with a broader definition of corruption. Instead, it requires
confronting a fallacy of the Supreme Court’s making at the heart of
campaign finance: the belief that coordination relates in an operational way to corruption.
II. BACKGROUND: THE COORDINATION CONTROVERSY
Corruption comes in many forms,13 but only one, according to today’s Supreme Court, has constitutional significance: the quid pro
quo.14 The quid pro quo—in a typical case, money for votes—has a
long history in American politics. George Washington bought votes
with liquor, 15 and Spiro Agnew accepted hundreds of thousands of
dollars in bribes.16 More recently, Congressman Randy Cunningham

13. See generally Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103 (2014).
14. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Any regulation must
instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.”); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
15. See TRACY CAMPBELL, DELIVER THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF ELECTION FRAUD, AN
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION—1742-2004, at 5 (2005).
16. Ten Most Corrupt Politicians, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Jan. 28, 2009, 4:04 PM),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/lists/most_corrupt_politicians/spiro-agnew.html.
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traded defense contracts for a Rolls Royce, 17 and the FBI found
$90,000 of dirty money in Congressman William Jefferson’s freezer.18
Federal bribery law prohibits quid pro quo corruption,19 but many
consider that insufficient on its own because the crime is difficult
to prove. As the Supreme Court wrote in Buckley, bribery laws “deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money
to influence governmental action.”20 Congress has responded to this
problem with campaign finance regulations, which serve as “prophylactic controls,” meaning they do not punish corruption ex post but
aim to prevent it ex ante.21 They do so by limiting the flow of corruptive money to politicians. Of course, they also limit the flow of uncorruptive money, meaning they prevent some lawful political
speech.22 The Court in Citizens United gestured to the tradeoff when
it stated that contribution limits “are preventative, because few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements.”23
Recognizing that Congress designs campaign finance regulations
to act as prophylactics sharpens the analysis. Before explaining why,
we examine some other legal details.
A. Basics of Campaign Finance
The law distinguishes contributions and expenditures. In brief, a
contribution refers to money given to a campaign,24 while an expenditure refers to other money spent to influence an election.25 The law
divides expenditures into two types, independent and coordinated.
17. See Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan Weisman, Congressman Admits Taking
Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/28/AR2005112801827.html.
18. See John Bresnahan, William Jefferson Convicted in Freezer Cash Case,
POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/25850.html.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. I 2012) (The statute applies to whoever “directly or
indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value” to a public official with
intent to influence an official act, or to a public official who “directly or indirectly, corruptly
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value” in
return for being influenced regarding an official act.).
20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam).
21. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014) (“It is worth keeping in
mind that the base [contribution] limits themselves are a prophylactic measure.”). The
prophylactic nature of the regulations may make these types of offenses easier to prove by
describing them in relatively broad terms.
22. Of the speech that gets limited, the relative shares of corruptive and un-corruptive
speech depend, of course, on one’s definition of corruption.
23. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
24. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) (Supp. II 2014); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.51-100.57 (2015); FEC,
Citizens’ Guide, at 4-7 (2014), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens_guide_brochure.pdf.
25. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9) (Supp. II 2014); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.110-100.114 (2015);
Kang, supra note 5, at 5 n.11. To illustrate, donating $2000 to a candidate would constitute
a contribution, and spending $2000 on a newspaper ad supporting the candidate would
constitute an expenditure.
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The next Section examines this distinction, but for now an example
will suffice. If an individual runs a newspaper ad without any input
from the politician it supports, then that individual makes an independent expenditure. If an individual runs the ad at the request of
the politician, or if the politician dictates the ad’s content, then the
individual makes a coordinated expenditure.
Congress has long imposed limits on both contributions and
expenditures, 26 and litigants have long challenged those limits on
constitutional grounds.27 The government has defended the limits by
arguing that it has an interest in combating corruption.28 In general,
the Supreme Court has sided with the government on contributions29
and coordinated expenditures30 and the challengers on independent
expenditures.31
What explains the Court’s decisions? The answer lies in its understanding of corruption.32 The Court has recognized that states have
an interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, 33 where “corruption” means quid pro quos. 34 Contributions,
which involve the direct conveyance of money to campaigns, raise a

26. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444-45 (reciting the Buckley Court’s
evaluation of “the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits set
forth in FECA”).
27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Supreme Court
sympathizes with challengers’ claims, stating in Buckley: “[C]ontribution and expenditure
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”
Id. at 14.
28. See, e.g., id. at 26-27.
29. See id. at 26-27, 29 (upholding contribution limits); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000) (same). But see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (invalidating
federal aggregate contribution limits); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-37 (2006)
(invalidating Vermont’s individual contribution limits).
30. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356-58 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47
(“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure . . . alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo . . . .”).
31. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (invalidating limits on independent expenditures);
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (same).
32. It also lies in the Court’s conclusion that independent expenditures are a purer
form of political speech and merit greater protection. The Buckley Court “explained that
expenditure limits ‘represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of political speech,’ while contribution limits ‘entai[l] only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.’ ” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 20-21).
33. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (“The Buckley Court recognized a ‘sufficiently
important’ governmental interest in ‘the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption.’ ” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)). We focus on actual corruption but briefly
address the appearance of corruption infra, Part IV.
34. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
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substantial risk of quid pro quo corruption.35 Likewise with coordinated expenditures, which, because of the coordination, can
“amount[] to disguised contributions.”36 In contrast, independent expenditures do not have such potential for corruption.37 As the Court
wrote in Buckley:
Unlike contributions [and coordinated expenditures], such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value
of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.38

The Court doubled down on this reasoning in Citizens United.
There the Court declared that “independent expenditures . . . do not
give rise to corruption.”39 Because such expenditures do not corrupt,
the government cannot limit them on anti-corruption grounds. 40
Hence the state of the law today: limits on contributions and coordinated expenditures exist at the federal level and in many states, but
35. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (“[T]he risk of corruption
arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder
himself.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (“[A] candidate lacking immense . . . wealth must
depend on financial contributions . . . . To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined.”).
36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
37. The Court’s view of the corruptive value of these forms of speech is intertwined
with its view of their expressive value. Professor Ortiz describes the “dual hydraulics” at
work in this area, “a hydraulics of expression . . . and a hydraulics of influence.” Daniel R.
Ortiz, Commentary, Water, Water Everywhere, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (1999). The shift
from contributions to independent expenditures represents an “increasingly less efficient
means of influence,” while “the Court believes the hydraulic efficiency of expression works
in the opposite direction.” Id. at 1745.
38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. Many people reject this conclusion. See, e.g., W.
Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, 35 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (“I absolutely do not agree that
corporate money in the form of ‘independent expenditures’ . . . cannot give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Briffault, supra note
9, at 100 (“The Supreme Court’s insistence that independent spending does not pose
dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruption has been doubtful from the
start . . . .”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412, 417 (2013) (“I find the majority’s sunny dismissal of the corrupting
influence of independent expenditures wholly unpersuasive.”).
40. Some believe the Court’s conclusion is legal rather than factual, rendering
empirical evidence moot. See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States
Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 360-61
(2014) (“[T]he Court admitted that it did not care whether independent expenditures
actually corrupt the political process because, in the Court’s eyes, independent
expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law, any evidence to the contrary
notwithstanding.”).
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limits on independent expenditures—whether by individuals or corporations—do not and cannot exist because they violate the First
Amendment.41
This overview uncovers a tension. Many actors spending money
on elections prefer to make independent expenditures, as they are
unlimited. But they also like to coordinate, as that increases the
value of their spending to the politicians they support (they run the
primetime television ad and not the radio spot). This tension has
led to expenditures that toe the line between independent and coordinated and focused attention on where that line falls.
B. Coordination Defined
What counts as coordination? 42 The question has “long stymied
Congress and the FEC”43 and just about everyone else.44 Part of the
problem is that the question has two parts. The first involves the
Constitution. Following Citizens United, Congress can limit only one
type of expenditure, a coordinated one. The constitutional question,
then, is: what counts as coordinated for purposes of determining the
scope of congressional authority?45 The second part involves existing
federal regulations: assuming they are constitutional, what exactly
do they mean? We focus on the second part, but eventually we will
return to the first.
The Code of Federal Regulations defines a coordinated expenditure as one “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at
the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized

41. Limits on independent expenditures do exist in some narrow cases. See, e.g., 52
U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting independent expenditures by foreign
nationals); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct.
1087 (2012) (rejecting a challenge to the ban on expenditures by foreign nationals).
42. We focus on current law. For a brief and helpful overview of the development of
the law on coordination, see Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping “Winks and Nods”:
Limits on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1166, 1175-79 (2006).
43. Carney, supra note 7.
44. See Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign
Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 606 (2013) (“There is, indeed, a great deal of
confusion about what coordination prohibits and why.”); Posner, supra note 9 (observing
that “the notion of ‘coordination’ is vague”).
45. We await an answer from the Supreme Court. See O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d
936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has yet to determine what ‘coordination’
means. Is the scope of permissible regulation limited to groups that advocate the election of
particular candidates, or can government also regulate coordination of contributions and
speech about political issues, when the speakers do not expressly advocate any person’s
election? What if the speech implies, rather than expresses, a preference for a particular
candidate’s election? If regulation of coordination about pure issue advocacy is permissible,
how tight must the link be between the politician’s committee and the advocacy group?”).
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committee, or a political party committee.”46 The FEC operationalizes
this definition with a three-prong test: payment, content, and conduct.47 The “conduct” prong, which is the source of controversy,48 involves the relationship between spender and candidate.
The FEC identifies five situations that, individually or together,
satisfy the conduct prong. 49 We summarize them. Consistent with
the FEC, we refer to the expenditure in question as a communication.
1. The communication is created, produced, or distributed at the
request or suggestion of the candidate.
2. The candidate is materially involved in decisions about a
communication’s content, intended audience, specific media outlet,
timing, frequency, size, prominence, or duration.
3. The communication is created after substantial discussions
about the communication between the actor funding it and the
candidate.50
4. The actor funding the communication hires a commercial
vendor (i.e., pollster or media consultant) who provided services to
the candidate in the prior 120 days, and the vendor either uses or
conveys to the actor information about the campaign material to
the communication.
5. A person who worked for the candidate’s campaign in the prior
120 days conveys information about the plans or needs of the
candidate to the actor funding the communication that are material to the communication.

46. 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 (2015); see § 109.21 (defining “coordinated communication”);
TREVOR POTTER & MATTHEW T. SANDERSON, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LOBBYING LAWS & GIFTS
RULES GUIDE, 3D § 10:19, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2014); cf. 52
U.S.C. § 30101(17) (Supp. II 2014) (defining an independent expenditure as one that is “not
made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the
candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee
or its agents”).
47. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2015); FEC, COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AND
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES 2-3 (2015), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ie_brochure.pdf.
The first prong addresses payment: the expenditure must be funded by someone “other than
a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, a political party committee or an agent of
the above.” Id. at 3; see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1) (2015). The second prong addresses
content: “[T]he expenditure must be either express advocacy, an electioneering
communication, or the republication of the candidate’s own materials.” Briffault, supra
note 9, at 96 n.47.
48. Briffault, supra note 9, at 96 n.47 (“The real issue for single-candidate Super
PACs is the conduct standard.”).
49. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)-(5) (2015); FEC, supra note 47, at 3-4.
50. “A discussion is ‘substantial’ if information about the candidate’s or political party
committee’s campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs is conveyed to a person paying for
the communication, and that information is material to the creation, production, or distribution of the communication.” FEC, supra note 47, at 4 n.3; see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(3)
(2015).
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The FEC qualifies these situations in two ways. 51 First, “agreement or formal collaboration between the person paying for the
communication and the candidate . . . is not required” to satisfy the
conduct prong.52 Second, except for when the candidate requests an
expenditure (situation number one above), the conduct prong is not
satisfied if the communication relies only on publicly available
information.53
An example may clarify.54 If an individual runs a newspaper ad
without any interaction with or input from the candidate, then that
constitutes an independent expenditure. That is true even if the ad
includes a photo taken by the candidate’s staff, as long as the photo
was publicly available. If the candidate requested or dictated the
content of the ad, even without a formal agreement, then the ad
constitutes a coordinated expenditure.
C. Controversy and Reform
In the newspaper example, the law may resonate with intuitions.
The independent ad probably has less corruptive potential than the
coordinated one, so it may seem sensible to impose limits only on the
latter. But now consider the scenario from the introduction. An oil
baron gives money to a super PAC run by a politician’s friend who,
up until 121 days ago, worked for the politician. The super PAC runs
a supportive ad. The politician did not request the ad, nor did she
have any input on it, so the ad is not a coordinated expenditure. But
because the friend knows the politician and her strategy, the ad
benefits the politician like a coordinated expenditure. Now the law
clashes with intuitions. The actual ad has the same corruptive potential as a coordinated ad, but the law classifies it as an independent
expenditure that, according to the Supreme Court, does not and cannot corrupt.
This scenario is hypothetical, but it captures the flavor of real
events. During the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney and top
advisors to Barack Obama appeared at fundraisers for supportive
super PACs.55 Those super PACs were run by former aids to those
51. The FEC has other qualifications and safe harbors as well, see FEC, supra note
47, at 4-7, but we only mention those most relevant to this paper.
52. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (2015); see FEC, supra note 47, at 4.
53. FEC, supra note 47, at 5.
54. All examples assume that the payment and content prongs of the FEC’s test are
satisfied. The action, as is the case in reality, involves prong three: conduct.
55. See Alexander Burns, Mitt Romney Addressing Super PAC Fundraisers, POLITICO
(July 28, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/60143.html; Michael
Luo & Nicholas Confessore, Top Obama Adviser to Appear at ‘Super PAC’ Meeting, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/top-obamaadviser-to-appear-at-super-pac-meeting/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2. Also, note that in
2014 President Obama himself appeared at events organized by pro-Democratic super
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candidates.56 In 2010, the National Republican Congressional Committee publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing outside groups
to fill gaps in the schedule.57 Recently, politicians used anonymous
Twitter accounts to provide polling information to outside groups
running ads. 58 In 2012, the independent group supporting Jon
Huntsman raised $2.8 million, $1.9 million of which came from
Huntsman’s father. 59 Similarly, Space PAC, which supported Congressional candidate Gabriel Rothblatt, raised $225,000, all of it from
Rothblatt’s parent.60 Rothblatt claimed that he had “taken pains” not
to communicate with his parent, stating, “You don’t want to, in a
casual conversation, cross a [coordination] line that can turn around
and bite you.”61 A recent report concluded that hundreds of millions
of dollars spent by outside groups in 2012 involved a “high degree of
cooperation” between candidates and those groups.62
These activities and spending do not run afoul of the coordination
limits. 63 The candidates (apparently) have not requested expenditures, nor (apparently) have they provided input on them. This leaves
many observers incredulous.64 They argue that candidates and outPACs, not to fundraise directly but to “draw an audience to their cause.” See Stein, supra
note 9.
56. See Fredreka Schouten, Super PACs, Candidates Blur Lines Ahead of Nov. 6, USA
TODAY (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:22 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/201202-29/super-pac-candidates-coordination/53307020/1.
57. See Jeanne Cummings, GOP Groups Coordinated Spending, POLITICO (Nov. 3,
2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44651.html.
58. See Chris Moody, How the GOP Used Twitter to Stretch Election Laws, CNN (Nov.
17, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/politics/twitter-republicans-outsidegroups/.
59. See Nicholas Confessore, Huntsman’s Father Gave $1.9 Million to Super PAC,
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/
huntsman-sr-gave-1-9-million-to-pro-huntsman-super-pac/.
60. See The Editorial Bd., Editorial, The Custom-Made ‘Super PAC’, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 3,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/the-custom-made-super-pac-.html?_r=2.
61. Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Schnaars, Some Candidates’ Super PACs Are a
Family Affair, USA TODAY (July 18, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/07/18/relatives-fund-candidate-super-pacs-rothblatt/12824361/.
62. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 2.
63. The practice of posting polling information via anonymous Twitter accounts may
be an exception. See Moody, supra note 58 (noting that the practice “raises questions about
whether [Republicans and outside groups] violated campaign finance laws that prohibit
coordination”).
64. See Bob Bauer, Coordinating with a Super PAC, Raising Money for It, and the
Difference Between the Two, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2014/01/coordinating-super-pac-raising-moneydifference-two/. Bauer explains:
To many unhappy observers of the state of contemporary campaign finance
doctrine, the latitude of the Super PAC to operate with the support of allies of
the candidate, former staff and friends, and to benefit from the candidate’s
endorsement or fundraising, seems intolerably silly. So they say that the
committee having this connection to the candidate cannot be “truly”
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side groups routinely coordinate—and may corrupt—as a matter of
fact, even if they do not coordinate as a matter of law.65 As Senator
Kent Conrad stated, “[T]his whole idea well, oh, they don’t coordinate, therefore it’s really independent is just nonsense.”66
Many observers have advocated reforms. Professor Richard
Briffault argues that expenditures by groups who focus their support
on only one candidate or a very small number of candidates and who
have tight links to the candidate(s) should be considered coordinated. 67 The American Anti-Corruption Act, drafted by former FEC
Chairman Trevor Potter and promoted by Professor Larry Lessig,
would broaden coordination rules.68 Minnesota’s Campaign Finance
and Public Disclosure Board has concluded that candidates cannot
solicit funds for supportive super PACs without crossing the coordination line.69 The list goes on.70
independent. In Buckley’s terms, though, it is, and any complaints should be
directed there.
Id.
65. For example, in response to an assertion about Space PAC’s independence, the
Editorial Board of the New York Times wrote, “Sorry, but that’s preposterous.” The
Editorial Bd., supra note 60; see also Brief of United States Senators Sheldon
Whitehouse & John McCain as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179) (“In sum, super PACs are
coordinating with campaigns, and they are using methods the Court did not contemplate in
its Citizens United decision.”); TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUPER CONNECTED 13
(2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/super-connected-march-2013-update-candidatesuper-pacs-not-independent-report.pdf (“There is a possibility (as was shown in the 2012
elections) for expenditures that are legally categorized as ‘independent’ to be other than
independent in practice.”); Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1681
(2012) (describing several ways that a candidate and a candidate-specific Super PAC can
“establish a successful working relationship without formal coordination”); Langvardt,
supra note 10, at 574 (“Everybody knows the big super PACs coordinate with candidates.”);
The Editorial Bd., Editorial, A Trickle-Down Effect of Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/opinion/a-trickle-down-effect-ofcitizens-united.html (“The Supreme Court’s central rationale for allowing unlimited
independent spending in support of a candidate is based on the unrealistic notion that the
money and the candidate’s campaign are, in fact, separate.”); Anna Palmer & Jim
VandeHei, A New Way to Buy Real Influence, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:37 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66673.html (“[A]s Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.)
explained, the distance between outside groups and candidates is mostly on paper.”).
66. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 65.
67. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 97-98. This position is one aspect of Professor
Briffault’s thoughtful proposal. Interested readers should consult Coordination
Reconsidered for the full proposal.
68. See THE AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT (2015), https://represent.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/AACA-Full-Provisions.pdf; Briffault, supra note 9, at 97 n.50
(“The American Anti-Corruption Act . . . presents a similar, albeit somewhat broader,
proposal for redefining coordination.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions,
Corruption, and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1521 (2014) (examining and critiquing the proposals by Briffault, Potter, and Lessig, and
arguing that some of the proposals might be unconstitutional).
69. See Caleb P. Burns & Eric Wang, Minnesota Campaign Finance Board Adopts
Stricter Position on Super PAC Coordination, WILEY REIN LLP (Mar. 2014),
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These proposals assume that the theory of coordination makes
sense, it just needs broader reach. In other words, they assume that
classifying more expenditures as coordinated, and therefore limited
by law, would combat quid pro quo corruption. For that logic to hold,
coordination and corruption must be meaningfully linked. But are they?
III. COORDINATION AND CORRUPTION
Consider again the three necessary, logical elements of quid pro
quo corruption.71 First, an actor must convey value to a politician (the
“quid”). The value could come in many forms, including a campaign
contribution, a briefcase full of cash, or a favor. Second, the politician
must convey value to the actor (the “quo”). This could include a vote
on favorable legislation, a helpful call to a regulator, assistance promoting the actor’s product,72 and so forth. Third, a bargain must link
the two (the “pro”). The actor’s conveyance must cause the politician’s
conveyance and vice versa. The money buys the vote, and the vote
buys the money.
http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-4912.html; see also Bob Bauer,
Minnesota on Candidate Fundraising for Independent Committees: Round Two and Still Struggling,
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/
2014/02/minnesota-candidate-fundraising-independent-committees-round-two-still-struggling/.
70. See Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign
Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 471, 509-10 (2015)
(proposing a candidate-action theory for limiting “indirect contributions,” in which “an
expenditure may be treated as a contribution if there are reliable indications . . . that an
expenditure will provide sufficient utility or perceived utility to a candidate such that quid
pro quo corruption becomes a strong concern”); Note, Working Together for an Independent
Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super PAC Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478,
1480 (2015) (proposing a redefinition of coordination “to include candidate-assisted Super
PAC fundraising activities”); The Editorial Bd., supra note 10 (calling the Empowering
Citizens Act “the best chance for ridding politics of special-interest cash and preventing
another era of scandal”); Paul S. Ryan, Commentary, New Report Highlights Need for
“Coordination” Reform Post-Citizens United, ROLL CALL (June 18, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/new_report_highlights_need_for_coordination_reform_post_
citizens_united-233970-1.html?pg=2&dczone=opinion (“It is time for the FEC to tighten up
its ‘coordination’ regulations—to bring the legal definition of coordination in better
alignment with the common sense meaning of the word.”); Summary of H.R. 270, the
Empowering Citizens Act, DEMOCRACY 21 (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.democracy21.org/ppfnotes/press-releases-ppf-notes/a-summary-of-h-r-6448-the-empowering-citizens-act-2/
(describing an act that would, among other things, propose “to strengthen and override the
ineffectual coordination regulations adopted by the FEC”).
71. These elements are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for quid pro quo
corruption. Federal bribery law requires proof of another element: the exchange of value
between an actor and a candidate must be “corrupt,” where the meaning of corrupt is not
clear. See Eric J. Tamashasky, The Lewis Carroll Offense: The Ever-Changing Meaning of
“Corruptly” Within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGIS. 129, 129-30, 139-41 (2004)
(describing the use of the term “corruptly” in 18 U.S.C. § 201 and other statutes). This
element is irrelevant for our purposes.
72. See, e.g., Katie Glueck, McDonnells Convicted of Corruption, POLITICO (Sept. 4,
2014, 11:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/bob-mcdonnell-trial-verdict-110602.
html (describing former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s conviction for corrupt practices
around the promotion of a dietary supplement).
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Bribery laws punish the satisfaction of these elements: if they are
met (or attempted), then the actor and politician go to prison.73 Campaign finance regulations impede the satisfaction of these elements.
This follows from their prophylactic character. The regulations do not
punish the crime of bribery but aim to prevent it by blocking one or
more steps necessary for its consummation.
To illustrate, consider limits on campaign contributions. They do
not impede politicians from conveying value to contributors, nor do
they make it harder for individuals and politicians to bargain.74 Contribution limits do not address these activities (the quo and the pro)
in any way. Instead, they limit the value contributors can convey to
politicians. By prohibiting donations beyond a certain size—no big
quid—they frustrate corruption.
Now consider limits on coordinated expenditures. They do not
impede politicians from casting favorable votes, awarding lucrative
contracts, making helpful calls, employing supporters’ relatives, or
promoting products. Nor could they impede most of these activities,
as most are fundamental to politicians’ jobs. The limits do deter politicians from providing direct input on expenditures. However, that
involvement is not independently valuable to the makers of those
expenditures in the corruption context. For bad actors, using politicians’ input to increase the effectiveness of their expenditures is just
a means to an end. It seems clear, then, that limits on coordinated
expenditures do not aim to prevent corruption by limiting the value
that politicians can convey.
If the limits do not target the quo, they must target the quid or the
pro. The Supreme Court thinks they do both. Recall Buckley, where
the Court wrote, “The absence of . . . coordination of an expenditure . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.”75
This implies that a coordinated expenditure conveys value. Limits on
coordinated expenditures then, like limits on contributions, limit
quids. The Court also wrote that the absence of coordination “allevi73. Satisfaction of any one of the three elements may result in a violation of the
federal bribery statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
74. Professor Brad Smith concludes otherwise, or at least he understands the
Supreme Court to conclude otherwise. He states that “corruption is in the bargain” and
contributions “are by definition coordinated with the candidate.” Smith, supra note 44, at
618. Limits on such contributions, then, are justified as a method for “limiting contact
between speakers and the candidate or his agents.” Id. at 619. We respectfully disagree.
Most contributions, particularly in the Internet age, come with no contact whatsoever
between donor and candidate. More importantly, contribution limits do not and cannot
impede bargaining because they are easily sidestepped. A corrupt donor can, without
violating the limits, contribute $1 every day, each time meeting with the candidate to
bargain. Alternatively, a corrupt donor can make a single, lawful contribution today and
meet with the politician every day thereafter to bargain. Indeed, a donor and politician can
meet any time they wish, and contribution limits do not and cannot prevent that.
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).
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ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo
for improper commitments from the candidate.”76 This implies that
coordination facilitates bargaining—the pro—and limits on coordination prevent it. We consider these possibilities in turn. Before doing
so, we note that discussions of coordination often blur the line
between value (quid) and bargain (pro).77 Part of our objective is to
sharpen that line. Doing so clarifies the theory behind coordination
and its weaknesses.
A. Coordination and Quids
In general, politicians have better information about their campaigns than outsiders, meaning they can spend money in support of
their campaigns more efficiently. This makes contributions especially
valuable, as politicians can use them to maximal effect. So, too, with
coordinated expenditures, which politicians can direct or influence to
suit their needs. This explains why contributions and coordinated
expenditures can act as quids—they convey value to politicians—and
why campaign finance law limits them. Now consider independent
expenditures. Without input from the relevant politician, who has
superior information, such expenditures will be less effective. 78 A
76. Id. (emphasis omitted).
77. For example, Hasen seems to offer a value theory, observing that a “candidate who
raises funds for a group by definition is coordinating fundraising strategy with that group;
the candidate is taking time to raise funds for the group rather than for his campaign.”
Hasen, supra note 68, at 20. Presumably, the candidate is raising funds for the group
because he expects the group’s expenditures to convey value to him. Ferguson also focuses
on value and would allow expenditures to be treated as contributions if there are “reliable
indications” that the “expenditure will provide sufficient utility or perceived utility to a
candidate such that quid pro quo corruption becomes a strong concern.” Ferguson, supra
note 70, at 510. But Ferguson also notes that his approach would leave the spender free to
make any expenditure “as long as it does not collaborate with the candidate,” which
suggests some focus on bargaining. Id. at 519 n.231. Smith, interpreting Buckley, offers a
bargain theory, stating that “corruption is in the bargain.” Smith, supra note 44, at 618; see
also Thomas R. McCoy, Understanding McConnell v. FEC and Its Implications for the
Constitutional Protection of Corporate Speech, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1052 (2005) (“[A]
restriction on coordinated expenditures . . . must be understood not as a restriction on the
expenditures, but rather as a restriction on the action of ‘coordinating’ the speech with the
candidate . . . .”). Bauer seems to focus on both value and coordination. See Bauer, supra
note 64 (arguing that for an interaction between speaker and candidate to constitute
coordination, it “must involve a matter of strategic significance . . . the core organizational
strategy for persuading voters.”). Briffault seems to focus on value. See Briffault, supra
note 9, at 91, 94 (arguing that single-candidate super PACs are essentially “alter egos for
the official campaign committees of the candidates whom they exist[] to serve” and thus it
is “unnecessary to establish coordination,” which we interpret to mean that value is
conveyed even absent a bargain). Hasen criticizes Briffault’s analysis for “apparently
conflat[ing] coordination with common purpose.” Hasen, supra note 68, at 19.
78. The Court’s analysis assumes that independent expenditures often do not convey
much value and may even take away value. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“Unlike
contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”); Bauer, supra note 64
(“Hence the difference between the contribution and the independent expenditure: the

414

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:399

supporter running an independent ad may say the wrong thing or say
it at the wrong time with the wrong images.79 Instead of conveying a
lot of value, the expenditure conveys only a little.
This conventional account works in theory. To work in practice,
the law must do a good job of sorting. Put differently, for coordination
regulations to suppress the conveyance of value, expenditures designed with “inside” information from campaigns must properly be
classified as “coordinated” and therefore limited. Does the law
properly sort? Consider again, briefly, the five situations in which an
expenditure satisfies the conduct prong of the coordination test.80 The
first arises when the expenditure is “created, produced, or distributed
at the request or suggestion of a candidate.”81 The other four arise
when a politician or someone else connected to a campaign directly
provides information to an outsider who uses that information when
crafting an ad.
These situations capture many expenditures designed with inside
information, but they do not capture all. The rules permit outsiders
to use any inside information that politicians make public. Outsiders
can listen to candidates’ speeches; check their websites; read their
Facebook posts; follow their Tweets;82 or use statements, strategies,
images, or videos that politicians have made publicly available.83 This
means that outsiders can, without coordinating, get much of the information they need to make their expenditures effective. This is

independent expenditure is fraught with the risk of failure, or worse, in advancing the
candidate’s prospects.”). We will show that the logic behind that assumption is not strong.
79. See, e.g., Lee Drutman, Five Takeaways from a New Campaign Finance Report,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 18, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/06/
18/new-soft-money/ (summarizing takeaways from a recent report, one of which being that
campaigns “don’t like all the outside money,” as it sometimes causes candidates to lose
control of their message or makes their campaign look “dumber and sillier”); James
Hohmann & Burgess Everett, Weiland Escalates Feud with Reid, POLITICO (Oct. 31,
2014, 11:56 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/rick-weiland-harry-reid-feud112375.html (noting that a Democratic Senate candidate said that the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee’s expenditures “hurt more than they helped”); Daniel
Lippman, Year of the ‘Regular Folk’, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:23 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/year-of-the-regular-folk-110912.html (observing that
sometimes campaign ads backfire when the “average Joes” featured on the commercial are
not properly vetted and embarrassing information is later revealed about them).
80. See supra Section II.B.
81. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1) (2015); see also supra Section II.B.
82. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 94 (“Why do they have to meet when they can
tweet?”).
83. See Shane Goldmacher, The Actual Intention Behind That Awkward Mitch
McConnell Video, NAT’L J. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/theactual-intention-behind-that-awkward-mitch-mcconnell-video-20140312.
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what prompts observers to state that “there’s always coordination—
the media is the coordination,” which makes non-coordination a
“farce.”84
To make this observation concrete, suppose that the value conveyed to a politician by political spending depends on the product
of two numbers: the amount spent, and the Efficiency Factor, or “EF”
for short. EF takes a value between -1 and 1, where higher values
indicate greater efficiency. 85 For contributions and coordinated expenditures, which have maximal effect, EF equals 1. Thus, a contribution of $2000 conveys $2000 in value. What about independent expenditures? An outsider with little knowledge of a campaign’s needs
and strategies may spend $2000 on a clunky, independent
ad. That expenditure may have an EF of just 0.1, meaning it conveys
only $200 in value, or even a negative EF, meaning it takes value
from the candidate. Here the Supreme Court is right: the absence of
coordination undermines the value of the expenditure, reducing the
risk of corruption. But now suppose the outsider has a lot of
knowledge, all acquired from public sources, of the campaign’s needs
and strategies. The outsider spends $2000 on a helpful ad with an EF
of 0.9, and the ad conveys $1800 in value. That independent ad,
which the Court tells us by definition cannot corrupt, looks suspiciously like a coordinated ad that can.
Much of the controversy over coordination reduces to a dispute
about EF. Critics argue that outsiders can, without violating the
regulations, collect enough information to run valuable ads. 86 This
means EF is large. We can understand reforms in the same terms.
Proposals to broaden coordination rules by putting more distance
between politicians and outsiders would make it harder for outsiders
to acquire campaign information.87 This would reduce EF.

84. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 65.
85. To simplify, we assume that the maximum value an expenditure can convey to a
politician is the face value of the money spent (in other words, EF cannot exceed 1).
Likewise, we assume the most harm an expenditure can cause is the negative face value of
the money spent (thus the smallest value of EF is -1). These assumptions keep the math
simple without affecting the logic.
86. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 9, at 93-94 (One of the several reasons offered by
Briffault is that “[c]andidates and committees don’t have to talk . . . they can communicate
through the press.”); Cummings, supra note 57 (describing how a congressional committee
publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing independent groups to use the information
to the candidates’ benefit without violating coordination rules).
87. The American Anti-Corruption Act, for example, would count as coordinated and
therefore limit any expenditure that was crafted with input from a family member or
former colleague of the politician. See THE AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, pt. 2,
provision 7, at 7-8 (2015), https://represent.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AACA-FullProvisions.pdf (recommending that the FEC’s coordination regulations be revised).

416

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:399

Suppose critics are right, EF is too large.88 This means the law
classifies some expenditures that are effectively coordinated—they
use campaign information and thus convey a lot of value to politicians—as independent expenditures that do not and cannot corrupt.
Can the law do better? Stricter coordination rules could further separate outsiders and politicians, but practical and constitutional hurdles limit this possibility. Unless the law prohibits candidates from
publicizing their platforms and strategies, and outsiders from paying
attention, then outsiders will always have enough information to
make expenditures that convey at least some value. Stricter rules
might drop EF to 0.6 or 0.3, but they almost certainly cannot drop it
below zero.89
This leads to a deep flaw in the coordination-rules-suppress-quids
logic. Recall that the value conveyed by an expenditure equals
the amount spent multiplied by EF. Reforms may shrink EF, but
they cannot shrink the amount spent. Citizens United holds that
independent expenditures cannot be capped.90 As a result, outsiders
who want to convey value to politicians can always do so by simply
spending more. Suppose a politician, as part of a corrupt exchange,
demands $50,000 in value. If EF equals 0.9, the outsider can convey
that amount by spending about $56,000 on independent ads.91 If EF
equals 0.5, the outsider must spend $100,000. As long as EF exceeds
zero—as long as independent expenditures benefit politicians, even if
just a tiny amount—then outsiders can convey the value necessary
for a corrupt transaction.92
EF almost certainly exceeds zero. The Supreme Court recognizes
as much. In McCutcheon v. FEC,93 the Court stated the absence of
coordination “undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi88. We mean the EF of the average or typical expenditure is too large. For
sophisticated outsiders, the EF associated with their expenditures might be very high,
while for less sophisticated outsiders it might be relatively low.
89. EF might drop below zero for any given expenditure. However, we conceptualize
EF as an average. The claim is not that, if EF exceeds zero, all independent expenditures
convey value. Rather, the claim is that the average independent expenditure conveys value.
90. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356-61 (2010).
91. Cf. Brendan Fischer, What Corruption? McCutcheon Reveals Absurdity of
Citizens United, PR WATCH (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/04/
12438/mccutcheon (noting James Simons’ $5 million contribution to the super PAC
supporting President Obama and stating, “Assuming just 5% of that total was of ‘value’ to
Obama . . . it [would still result in] a $250,000 donation.”).
92. This assumes that outsiders have enough money, which the wealthiest and most
sophisticated ones will. We return to this issue below. For now, we note an interesting
point made by Brent Ferguson. He argues that “an outside group can probably raise more
money if a candidate does the fundraising.” Ferguson, supra note 70, at 489. It follows that
if candidates cannot assist outside groups with fundraising, at least some of those groups
will lack the resources to convey value to politicians.
93. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
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date. . . . But probably not by 95 percent.”94 EF almost certainly will
continue to exceed zero following any tightening of coordination
rules. This means the law, now and always, sorts imperfectly. Some
effectively coordinated ads will get treated as independent ads. Those
ads, like contributions and coordinated expenditures, convey value
and can serve as quids. In fact, because they are unlimited,
they make better quids. 95 When EF equals just 0.1, an
independent expenditure of $100,000—chump change in American
politics 96 —conveys $10,000 in value, much more than any lawful
contribution.97
One might respond that this argument goes too far. If coordination
rules are somewhat effective and EF is small, then the rules provide
some deterrent effect. If EF is 0.2, for example, conveying $1 million
in value requires $5 million in expenditures. Many outsiders cannot
afford such large amounts, or if they can, the quo they expect in
return will not justify the expense. So while it may be true that, in
theory, outsiders can convey value regardless of the (positive) value of
EF, in practice they cannot or will not. It follows that coordination
rules, even if they do not limit all valuable expenditures, limit some.
Better to stop some corruption than none.98
The response is valid, but note two points. As EF grows, the objection dissipates. Even after a tightening of coordination rules, EF
might be close to 1. More fundamentally, to make this argument is to
concede an irony of coordination: the law focuses on the least harmful
targets. Coordination regulations make it harder for relatively poor
outsiders to engage in corruption. They make it harder for outsiders
whose corrupt acts will not benefit them much. Such acts probably do
94. Id. at 1454 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
95. See Kang, supra note 5, at 30 (“When . . . independent expenditures can be made
without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be greater than
the risk from capped contributions.”).
96. During the 2012 presidential election, the super PACs Restore our Future and
American Crossroads had spent over $142 million and $91 million, respectively, while
Priorities USA Action had spent over $66 million. Independent Spending Totals,
N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/independent-expenditures/
totals (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). In 2012, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson gave $10 million
to one super PAC, and in 2004, George Soros gave $23.7 million in total to several PACs.
Will Oremus, The Biggest Political Donations of All Time, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:30 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/01/sheldon_adelson_newt_gin
grich_and_the_largest_campaign_donations_in_u_s_history_.html.
97. At the federal level in the 2013–2014 campaign cycle, contributions by individuals
to candidates were limited to $2600 (adjusted for inflation). During the same cycle,
contributions by multicandidate PACs were limited to $5000. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A)
(Supp. II 2014) (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006)); FEC, CONTRIBUTIONS 2
(2014), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contributions_brochure.pdf.
98. As Brad Smith observes, “[N]o system will address every potential source of
corruption, and . . . a regulatory regime can be effective without being even close to
perfect.” See Smith, supra note 44, at 609.
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relatively little harm to society. Coordination regulations do not deter
outsiders with lots of money from engaging in very lucrative—and
presumably very harmful—corruption.
B. Coordination and Pros
Corruption, at least the kind modern campaign finance law focuses on, requires a bargain. Someone must convey value to a politician
in exchange for a favor and vice versa. The bargain could be explicit,
as when conspirators agree to terms over dinner, or implicit, as when
a “wink or nod” closes the deal.99 Coordination limits can deter corruption by frustrating bargaining. The Supreme Court believes they
do exactly this, or aspire to, and others have described the Court’s
reasoning in that manner. Professor Brad Smith uses the term “coordination” synonymously with “discussions and dealings between the
parties.”100 Professor Larry Lessig explains the Court’s understanding
of independent expenditures as follows: “There may be a quid. There
may be a quo. But because the two are independent, there is no pro.”101
Do existing coordination rules frustrate bargaining? In theory,
maybe a little, but in practice, almost certainly not. Recall, this time
in reverse order, the situations in which an expenditure satisfies the
conduct prong of the coordination test.102 The fifth and fourth situations arise when someone (not the politician) recently connected to a
campaign provides information to an outsider that is material to that
outsider’s ad or other expenditure. These situations have very little
to do with bargaining.103 They do not prevent an outsider from hiring
someone recently connected to a campaign—the kind of person who
could negotiate a deal—nor do they prevent outsiders from talking
directly to politicians. The third and second situations arise when the
politician provides input on the contents or form of an expenditure.
99. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a
‘wink or nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’ ”), overruled in part on other
grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). As stated above, supra Section
II.B, “agreement or formal collaboration . . . is not required” to find coordination. 11
C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (2015). See FEC, supra note 47, at 4.
100. See Smith, supra note 44, at 632. Smith uses this language to describe the
Supreme Court’s reasoning, not necessarily his own.
101. Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2010),
http://bostonreview.net/lessig-democracy-after-citizens-united. We understand Lessig to be
explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning, not accepting it.
102. See supra Section II.B.
103. In fact, these situations have almost nothing at all to do with bargaining. These
conduct prongs would only apply if the common vendor (prong 4) or former staffer (prong 5)
conveyed information to the outside group that is “material to the creation, production, or
distribution of the communication.” 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4)(iii) (2015); see also 11 C.F.R.
109.21(d)(5)(ii) (2015) (same). The person can join the outside group, convey all sorts of
“inside” information, and (illegally) negotiate a bargain with the candidate, all without
violating these conduct prongs.
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These situations cannot block much bargaining. For one thing, enforcement presents a challenge. Imagine a bad actor and a crooked
politician prepared to engage in an illegal deal. All they need is a
chance to bargain over details, like the exact contents of the ad that
will serve as a quid. Will coordination rules cause them to pull back,
or will they violate the rules under the safe assumption that not every conversation gets monitored? We suspect the latter. But suppose
we are wrong and would-be criminals, for whatever reason, respect
this particular rule and do not discuss the substance of the quid. As
far as the coordination rules are concerned, they can still bargain;
they just cannot discuss the substance of the expenditure.
To illustrate, suppose an outsider and a politician agree to a
corrupt exchange. The outsider gets a favorable vote on a bill, and
the politician gets expenditures worth $100,000 to her. How can the
outsider convey the $100,000? The parties could coordinate on the
contents of an ad. The ad would have an EF of 1, or close to it, and
the outsider could fulfill his end of the bargain by spending $100,000,
or only slightly more. Of course, that ad would violate the limit on
coordinated expenditures.104 Alternatively, the parties could not coordinate on the contents of the ad. Instead, they could agree that the
outsider would contribute money to a third-party group—say, a super
PAC—that supports the candidate. 105 The super PAC need not know
about the illegal exchange; the parties surely would prefer that it not.
The higher the super PAC’s EF, the less the outsider would have to
contribute to convey $100,000. This exchange, though illegal, would
not violate the coordination rules.106 Even if perfectly enforced, the
rules mentioned so far would not address this kind of bargaining.
However, we are left with the first prong, which arises when the
expenditure is “created, produced, or distributed at the request or
suggestion of the candidate.”107 Although the fifth, fourth, third, and
second situations in which an expenditure becomes coordinated
would not capture the scenario just described, the first one would.
Nonetheless, the first prong also has limitations. Enforcement again
104. See supra Section II.A.
105. Professor Rick Hasen makes these arguments: “[U]nscrupulous donors and
candidates could agree to a bribe, with the money going to a[n outside] group committed to
doing everything to elect the candidate. That [group] need not even know about the
bribe[.]” Hasen, supra note 68, at 7. Disclosure requirements can facilitate this kind of
illegal bargaining. The politician can confirm that the outsider contributed the money as
promised by checking the FEC’s website. See generally Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin F.
Aiken, Disclosure and Corruption, 14 ELECTION L.J. 148 (2015).
106. It may, however, violate solicitation rules. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.60-61 (2015);
Advisory Opinion from Cynthia L. Bauerly, Chair, FEC, to Marc. E. Elias, Esq., Ezra W.
Reese, Esq., and Jonathan S. Berkon, Esq., Perkins Coie LLP (June 30, 2011),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202011-12.pdf. We thank David Keating for pointing this
out.
107. See supra Section II.B.

420

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:399

presents a challenge: can we monitor politicians’ utterances? Can we
be sure Rothblatt and his parent, while barbequing in the family’s
backyard, do not exchange a few words about expenditures? Setting
that aside, bad actors could avoid this situation by not discussing expenditures. In the example, the outsider and politician could agree to
the corrupt exchange while leaving the nature of the quid openended. Instead of agreeing to convey expenditures worth $100,000,
they could agree that the outsider would convey $100,000 in value.
The outsider could then opt to convey the value with expenditures.
The coordination rules do not address this kind of corrupt bargaining.
Could tighter coordination rules make it harder for outsiders and
politicians to bargain? Probably not, as practical and constitutional
hurdles stand in the way. Bargaining proceeds through communication, and the First Amendment takes a dim view of limitations on
communication. The law can forbid bargaining over expenditures and
campaign strategy, but it cannot forbid discussions generally. Outsiders, politicians, and their low-profile agents can talk on the phone,
exchange emails or texts, chat on the subway, exchange a few words
at a fundraiser, or meet for drinks in a private backyard. These are
settings in which corrupt bargaining may take place, and these are
modes of communication that the law probably cannot—and for political reasons, almost certainly will not—reach.
IV. COORDINATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
Recall that the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations
turns on their potential to fight corruption. 108 Recall also that
the regulations serve as prophylactics. 109 They supplement bribery
laws, not by punishing corruption but by stifling one or more of its
necessary elements. This means that courts, in assessing the constitutionality of such regulations, must consider their marginal effect on
corruption. The question is not, how much corruption does the combination of bribery laws and campaign finance regulations prevent?
The question is, how much corruption does the combination prevent
above and beyond bribery laws alone?
Answering this question requires an omniscience that we sadly
lack. But we can, as courts do, make headway with intuitions. Existing coordination rules cannot stifle a lot of quids. As discussed, the
rules allow outsiders to gather information about campaign needs
and strategies from public sources. This means their expenditures,
even without any campaign contact, can be effective (EF is positive).
Effectiveness plus the ability to make unlimited independent expenditures means outsiders can convey value to politicians. Candidates
108. See supra Section II.A.
109. See supra Part II.
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appreciate $1 million spent on somewhat useful (independent) ads,
perhaps more than they appreciate smaller amounts spent on very
useful (coordinated) ads.
Just as existing rules cannot suppress many quids, or many big
ones, they cannot prevent much bargaining. As discussed, most of the
provisions do not target bargaining, and bad actors can sidestep the
provisions that do. They can bargain without discussing the details of
an expenditure or without raising the possibility of an expenditure
at all.
These intuitions suggest that existing coordination rules do not
prevent much corruption, as bad actors can easily evade the limits.
As a result, in the balance that determines the constitutionality of
coordination rules, the weight on the “permissible” side of the scale
may be light. Meanwhile, the weight on the “impermissible” side remains the same as always. Some non-corrupt outside groups, hoping
to exercise their First Amendment rights, would like to coordinate
with politicians, and coordination limits stymie them. How to weigh
these pros and cons? We do not believe the Constitution provides a
clear answer. Our point is simply that the constitutional argument
for existing coordination limits may be weaker than commonly supposed. The problem is not that the limits chill a lot of speech (though
they might), and the problem is not that coordinated expenditures do
not corrupt (they might corrupt a lot). The problem is that the coordination rules hardly deter.110
One might respond that this reasoning, whatever its implications
for existing coordination limits, can be disarmed with stricter rules.
Broader regulations that reclassify many independent expenditures
as coordinated would do a better job of combating corruption, which
would in turn strengthen the argument for their constitutionality.
Suppose, for example, that the government adopted Professor
Briffault’s proposal to classify as coordinated, and therefore limited,
all expenditures by groups who focus their support on only one candidate or a very small number of candidates and who have tight
links to the candidate(s). 111 To spend freely, groups would have to
support more candidates and loosen their ties to them—no more
former campaign managers on the super PAC staff. This might
reduce the effectiveness of the group’s expenditures. Rather than
relying on the former campaign manager’s insights about the politician’s needs, the group would have to resort to public sources. Of

110. Recall that our analysis focuses on actual corruption. We briefly address the
appearance of corruption below.
111. Briffault, supra note 9, at 97-100. Again, we do not describe the proposal in full,
and interested readers should consult Professor Briffault’s paper.
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course, those sources are plentiful and easily accessible, so perhaps
their effectiveness would not suffer much. EF may dwindle, but only
by a little.
Rather than focusing on ties, one might focus on numbers. Requiring a group to support multiple candidates might make it harder to
convey value. Giving $50,000 to a super PAC that supports one candidate benefits that candidate, or is likely to, in a way that giving the
money to a super PAC that supports dozens of candidates may not.112
But this reasoning has a limit, too. If a politician sees an uptick in
support from a group following a contribution to that group, he or she
may reasonably infer that the support traces to the contributor.113
Even if not, this problem resolves with the usual antidote: more money. A politician who seeks $50,000 in value from a corrupt actor may
not be satisfied by a contribution of $100,000 to a group that supports
him and many other candidates. He might, however, be satisfied by a
contribution of $500,000.
Dilemmas like these will infect any reform proposal that targets
quids. As discussed, unless the government prevents politicians from
broadcasting information, and outsiders from listening, those outsiders, or at least the wealthy ones capable of causing the greatest social
harm, will have what they need to convey value. Stricter coordination
rules cannot do much to suppress bargains either. No plausible, constitutional set of rules will prevent outsiders and politicians from
conversing.
This suggests that the constitutional case for stricter coordination
rules may not be so strong. Such rules cannot frustrate bargaining,
and though they might make it harder to convey value, that effect,
given the workarounds, could be small. Meanwhile, stricter rules
would chill more speech. Depending on the magnitudes of these effects (and the weights one gives them on the First Amendment balance) the constitutional case for stricter rules might be weaker than
that for existing rules.
The preceding arguments may look different if we shift focus from
actual corruption to the appearance of corruption. Recall that states
have an interest in preventing quid pro quos and the appearance
of quid pro quos. 114 Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the
existing coordination rules, we doubt that they reduce the appear112. See id. at 97 (“If an organization is involved in multiple election contests, then
donations to the organization cannot be said to go to the aid of a specific candidate. In that
case . . . the link between a particular donor and a particular candidate is attenuated.”).
113. Suppose, for example, that a group was required to support at least ten
candidates. A donor could give the group $100,000, and the group could then spend $1000
supporting each of the first nine candidates, saving the remaining $91,000 for the tenth
candidate.
114. See supra Section II.A.
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ance of corruption in a meaningful way. If we are wrong, then the
constitutional case for such rules is stronger than we have suggested.
Similarly, if new, stricter coordination rules would reduce the appearance of corruption, then the constitutional case for those rules
would also grow stronger.
Before carrying these ideas too far, however, consider the mechanisms through which coordination rules might improve appearances.
One possibility is that the appearance of corruption correlates with
actual corruption, so that as actual corruption declines appearances
improve and vice versa. If that is the mechanism, and given the
doubts expressed above about the ability of coordination rules to
dampen corruption, we are skeptical that coordination rules, however
strict, can improve appearances in a meaningful way.115 Another possible mechanism is more instinctual: politics just seems less corrupt
with coordination rules in place. If that is the mechanism, then
things get complicated—and possibly paradoxical. If coordination
rules improve the appearance of corruption, and if improving appearances reduces vigilance and enforcement, then coordination rules can
improve appearances while making actual corruption worse.116
V. CONCLUSION: COORDINATION AS THE WRONG PATH
The foregoing analysis does not square with Supreme Court
doctrine. Since Buckley, the Court has made clear that Congress
can limit coordinated expenditures.117 Consequently, there must be a
way to define “coordinated” in a constitutional way. Likewise, there
must be a way to distinguish “independent” expenditures, which the
government cannot limit, from the rest. But the Court has never
tried to do this work, perhaps because the challenge is too great.
Consider the Court’s declaration in Citizens United:
“[I]ndependent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption,” 118
where corruption means quid pro quos. The term “independent”
115. For the possibility that an improved appearance of corruption might reduce actual
corruption as the result of a “beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy,” see Adam M. Samaha,
Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1609-10 (2012) (“[T]he
chance of a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy counterbalances concerns about regulatory
efficacy. . . . [A] favorable appearance would pull reality toward lower actual corruption
levels.”). For that to be the case in this setting, coordination regulations would first have to
improve the appearance of corruption.
116. This point relates to one developed by Gilbert and a coauthor in a separate paper.
See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 105 (suggesting laws requiring disclosure of campaign
finance information can improve the appearance of corruption while worsening actual
corruption).
117. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47, 78 (1976) (per curiam); FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 447 (2001); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 202-03, 219-23 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
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cannot mean “non-corrupt,” or the reasoning becomes tautological.
Instead, independent must mean an expenditure that does not
convey a quid, involve a pro, or both.119 Now the logic works, but the
operational problem looms. The law cannot sort expenditures into the
“independent” category based on whether the spender and politician
actually bargained. We almost never know if they bargained, and if
we know they did, then the government can prosecute them under
bribery laws, rendering proper categorization of the expenditure
moot.120 Likewise, the law cannot sort them on the basis of whether
there was an opportunity to bargain. While discussing the contents of
an expenditure, an outsider and politician have an opportunity
to bargain illegally. But that opportunity is one of many; they can
bargain illegally just about any time. Expenditures that come after
x+1 bargaining opportunities cannot raise significantly greater corruption concerns than expenditures that come after x bargaining opportunities when x is a half-dozen, twenty, or a hundred.
To see the depth of the problem in another way, consider what it
would take for coordination rules targeting corrupt bargaining to
serve as a prophylactic, that is, to deter corrupt bargaining that
would not be deterred by bribery laws alone. An outsider and a politician would have to be prepared to negotiate a quid pro quo in violation of bribery laws but not prepared to discuss details of an expenditure in violation of coordination limits.121
119. It could also mean an expenditure that does not involve a quo but, as discussed,
that does not work in practice or seem to be the target of the law.
120. Federal bribery law only requires an offer of a favor. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012).
121. If a violation of coordination rules were easier for the government to detect than
bribery, or carried a severer sanction, or both, then an outsider and politician might behave
as the sentence states. Perhaps these conditions could be satisfied, but it is hard to see
how. The government can prosecute a person for bribery if they simply offer illegal favors.
18 U.S.C. § 201(b). We see no reason to believe that observing a conversation about
coordination could be easier than observing a conversation involving an offer of illegal
favors. Likewise, the sanction for coordination violations probably will not exceed the
sanction for bribery. The sanction for bribery may include imprisonment for up to fifteen
years, a fine the greater of three times the value of the bribe or the statutory maximum of
$250,000, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b); Public Corruption, 51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1549,
1564-65 (2014). For coordination violations, civil penalties shall not exceed the greater of
$7500 or the amount of the contribution or expenditure in question, or the greater of
$16,000 or 200% of the amount involved for knowing and willful violations. See 11
C.F.R. § 111.24(a) (2015). Criminal sanctions for coordination violations are only
appropriate if the violations were committed “knowingly and willfully,” and such sanctions
may include prison sentences. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d) (Supp. II 2014) (formerly codified at
2 U.S.C. § 437g (2012)); Election Law Violations, 51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 963, 979 (2014).
However, the sanction for coordination violations is usually derived through a conciliation
process, see 11 C.F.R. § 111.18 (2015), and most often leads to civil penalties, see Quick
Answers to Compliance Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_compliance.
shtml#penalties (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). Punishment for coordination violations is “up
to the six-member FEC – split evenly between Republicans and Democrats . . . .” Rachael
Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super PACs, Candidates,
Tough to Enforce, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM),
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The law also performs poorly when sorting expenditures into the
independent category by focusing on value. Here there are two choices: focus on EF, or focus on amount spent. By definition, coordination
focuses on EF, which creates the problems discussed. Even broad
definitions of coordination will not keep outsiders from gathering
what they need, and this plus unlimited spending means they can
reliably convey value. This dilemma presumably worsens as technologies change and politicians get better at publicizing, and outsiders
at absorbing, key information.
One might respond that we have misdiagnosed the problem. The
trouble is not with coordination rules per se but with coordination
rules in a world where the only relevant form of corruption is quid
pro quo corruption. Perhaps such rules would make more sense if the
government had an interest in combating quid pro quos and also “the
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors.” 122 That was the state of the law before the Roberts
Court. But we do not believe this is right. However corruption is
defined, it presumably worsens when individuals can convey value to
politicians and meet with them or their representatives for quiet conversations. As explained, coordination rules can do little to prevent
these activities, at least when wealthy and sophisticated actors are
involved. The flaws with coordination do not depend on particular
definitions of corruption.
Perhaps all of these observations, troubling though they may be,
just support the usual maxim that rules are under and overinclusive. We have shown that coordination rules cannot capture
some behaviors they should (corrupt speech) and capture others they
should not (non-corrupt speech). Those deficiencies reduce but do not
eliminate the value of the rules: surely they stop some corruption.
They probably do stop some corruption, but we have shown that
they stop less—perhaps substantially less—than one might think.
This does not mean coordination rules should be abandoned. But it
does mean that their under-inclusiveness is worse than commonly
supposed.
We should not assume that the Supreme Court, when it drew the
line between coordinated and independent expenditures, understood
the deficiencies with the coordination framework. Nor should we
assume that the Court, had it understood the deficiencies, would
nevertheless have drawn the line it did. Perhaps the Court, had it
considered all of the above, would have concluded that the independhttp://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/13/7866/rules-against-coordination-between-superpacs-candidates-tough-enforce.
122. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (articulating this
broader conception of corruption and tracing it to Buckley).
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ent/coordinated distinction led down the wrong path, one that could
not reduce corruption by much, and therefore made the constitutional
structure unsound. Perhaps the Court would have selected the other
choice, ignoring EF and permitting the government to limit the
amount one could spend, whether that spending was in some sense
coordinated or not. That may have chilled more speech, but it would
have related much more logically to the problem of corruption.

